Nov

30

What the Chechens told the Marines

November 30, 2007 |

On 11 December 1994, a force of approximately 40,000 Russians attacked into Chechnya against a force of no more than 5,000-7,000 Chechens. After reaching the Chechen capital of Grozny, 6,000 Russian soldiers conducted a three-pronged mechanized attack into the city following a 10 day aerial and artillery bombardment of the city against a force of not more than 1,000 Chechens. Instead of the anticipated light resistance, Russian forces encountered a determined enemy armed with “massive amounts”[ii] of antitank weapons. The Russian attack was repulsed with shockingly high losses and it took another 2 months of heavy fighting and changing Russian tactics to capture Grozny. The estimated Russian casualty count between January and May of 1995 totaled 2,805 killed, 10,319 wounded, 393 missing and another 133 captured.[iii]

The results of these catastrophic losses in the initial battle for Grozny have been set as a text book example on how a determined unconventional force can utilize the urban operational environment to defeat a technologically and numerically superior force. David P. Dilegge, urban operations

If you are even slightly interested in the nature of urban warfare make a cup of coffee and go and read what the Chechen commanders told a researcher working for the US Marines. The Chechen conflict is a barbarism on both sides and, sadly, the Chechen end has been infiltrated by jihadis; but the original fighters were extraordinary and this article explains how.

Looking at the second battle of Fallujah the Marines learned a lot.


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