Of Sovereignty

The continued disengagement from the fight by Pakistani military forces unwilling to combat terrorists and insurgents within their own country is indeed troubling. President Musharraf’s recent decision to fully disengage and withdraw his most capable combat forces from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas by January 2008 certainly does not bode well for continued distanced engagement or non-engagement by American forces. In the end, defeating al-Qaeda in Pakistan will require direct American military action on the ground. The alternative is to accept the consequences of a strengthening al-Qaeda insurgency that is gaining momentum. threats watch

The negotiated withdrawal of Pakistan from the Tribal Areas is, de facto, if not de jure, the end of it claims to be sovereign in those areas. In effect, by fully withdrawing, Pakistan can be argued to have given up a portion of its territory.

So, now what? At the moment the facts on the ground suggest that the Islamist parties supported by the Taliban - which never recognized the artificial border between Afghanistan and Pakistan - and muscled up with alQaeda hard men have the running of the provinces in hand.

The thin veil of of Pakistani sovereignty is in tatters and now the question becomes what, if anything, is to be done.

I’ve not written much about the Long War for a few months simply because I have been thinking about what a serious Western response can and should be. The destruction of the Syrian/North Korean/Iranian nuclear facility a few days ago was a good response. The gradual increase in security in Iraq with the ongoing defeats of alQaeda in Mesopotamia is another good response. So is the ratcheting up of the sanctions against Iran and the ongoing security effort in Afghanistan.

However, what seems to be lacking in these responses is a theory of the Long War.

America’s first war, initiated by none other than Thomas Jefferson was against the Muslim pirates of the Barbary Coast. It was a largely navel war and it made a critical assumption: the pirates could not operate without bases and those bases were legitimate targets.

If we think of alQaeda as pirates - essentially stateless criminals with significant local power - a logic for dealing with it emerges. On the one hand good intelligence can and has been used to blunt the force of their attacks, on the other, relentless pressure on the bases which are essential to their continued survival makes sense as well.

Which brings me back to the question of sovereignty: when a country ceases to police or defend a portion of its territory can it really be said to have sovereignty over it? And, if it does not exercise its rights and responsibilities as sovereign is it not open to others to do the job? Lord knows alQaeda is killing Canadians with people trained in provinces in which the Pakistani government’s writ no longer runs. Perhaps it is time to erase the imaginary line and take the battle to the people who are financing and supporting our Taliban enemies.

Written by jay on September 26th, 2007 with no comments.
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